The safety of keys is the Achilles' heel of cryptography. A key backup at an escrow service lowers the risk of loosing the key, but increases the danger of key disclosure. We propose Recoverable Encryption (RE) schemes that alleviate the dilemma. RE encrypts a backup of the key in a manner that restricts practical recovery by an escrow service to one using a large cloud. For example, a cloud with ten thousand nodes could recover a key in at most 10 minutes with an average recovery time of five minutes. A recovery attempt at the escrow agency, using a small cluster, would require seventy days with an average of thirty five days. Large clouds have become available even to private persons, but their pay-for-use structure makes their use for illegal purposes too dangerous. We show the feaibility of two RE schemes and give conditions for their deployment.
Introduction
Data confidentiality ranks high among user needs and is usually achieved using high quality encryption. But what the user of cryptography gains in confidentiality he looses in data safety because the loss of the encryption key destroys access to the user's data. A frequent cause for key loss is some personal catastrophy that befalls the owner of the owner such as a fire that destroys the device(s) with passwords and keys. Organizations have to prevent a scenario where the sole employee with access to an important key leaves the organization or becomes incapacitated. In the past, keys were lost in natural disasters, such as when the basement of a large insurance (!) company was flooded and keys and their backups were destroyed. Many patients encrypt files with health data, but access to them becomes crucial especially if a health issue discapacitates the patient. Encrypted family data needs to be able to allow for their owner's disappearance, e.g. on a hiking trip in the Alaskan wilderness.
A common approach to key safety is a remote backup copy with some escrow service [JLS10]. The escrow service can be a dedicated commercial service, an administrator at the organization, a volunteer service, . . . However, if the user entrusts a key to an escrow service, the user has to be able to trust the escrow service itself. The escrow service not only needs to prevent accidental and malicious disclosure by insiders and outsiders, but most be able to convince its users that the measures taken to protect the keys against disclosure or loss are of sufficient strength. This might explain why the use of escrow service is not very popular. No wonder that some users prefer to forego encryption [MLFR02], or prefer less security by using a weak or repeated password.
The Recoverable Encryption (RE) scheme [JLS10] is intended to alleviate the problem. It encrypts a backup of the key so that the decryption of the backup is possible without the owner using brute-force. Legitimate, authorized recovery is easy, while unauthorized recovery is computationally involved and dangerous. RE [JLS10] or Clasas [SL10] was designed for client-side encrypted data stored in a large LH* file in a cloud. The key backup is subjected to secret sharing and the shares are spread randomly over many LH* buckets. To recover the key, an adversary has to intrude buckets, which are stored in different sites, and search them until she can recover all or sufficient shares of the key. Thus, unauthorized recovery of the key involves illegal activity and is at best cumbersome.
Here, we present more general schemes, which we call collectively Recoverable Encryption through a Noised Secret (RENS). In these schemes, a single computer or cloud node suffices as the storage for key backups. The client uses an encryption of the backup key that resists brute force at the site of the escrow agency, decryption is possible through brute force by distributing the workload over the many nodes of a cloud. The user can choose an encryption strenght based on the maximum time D needed to recover the key at the site of the escrow service. On average, the time to key retrieval is D/2. The user will choose a time D in years or at least months, depending on his trust into the additional security measures of the escrow service. The user will also specify at maximum time R for legitimate recovery, which is in the range of minutes or even seconds. The relationship between R and D is given by the number N of cloud nodes needed for legitimate recovery and is approximately given by N = D/R Cloud computing has brought large-scale distributed computing to the masses. The possibility to rent a large number of standardized virtual servers for short amounts of time and that allow remote access changes the possibilities of a small organization or even an individual, bringing them tremendous compute power without investing into a proper IT infrastructure. The fact that this is a paid-for service brings additional benefits, as a cloud user can be forensically connected to any services used not only by user data and login information, but also by the money trail. Nowadays, the number N of nodes is at least in the tens of thousands. Large clouds are now available to legitimate users. Today, (2012), Google and Yahoo
